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Book Reviews
On Strategy
Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of
Uncertainty
Perspectives on Strategy
The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice
by Colin S. Gray
Reviewed by Major Nathan K. Finney, US Army strategist currently on
the Army Staff.

F

ew authors have been more prolific, or as penetrating, as Dr. Colin
S. Gray. Currently wrapping up a career in academia at the University
of Reading as the a professor in the Department of International Politics
and Strategic Studies and the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies,
he also served as a defense advisor for both American and British governments, at one point serving on the Reagan Administration’s General
Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. These experiences, together with decades of research, led to over two-dozen books,
multiple edited volumes, and innumerable journal articles.
Among this vast body of work, the trilogy of The Strateg y Bridge:
Theory for Practice, Perspectives on Strateg y, and Strateg y and Defence Planning:
Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty will most shape this discipline – and
the education of practicing defense and strategic planners – well into
the future.
While all three are complementary, The Bridge and Perspectives are
the most similar. Much as his predecessor in strategic theory, Carl
von Clausewitz, whose magnum opus On War was written to explain
a general theory of war that could be used in educating practitioners,
Gray uses these two tomes to delve into a general theory of strategy. The
Bridge is the more comprehensive of the two, taking Clausewitz’s theory
and building upon it to describe the dicta and parameters necessary for
practitioners to bridge tactics and policy – to be “good enough” in the
translation of force into political effect. Perspectives, on the other hand,
expounds upon some of the specific dimensions of strategy Gray was
unable to address sufficiently in The Bridge. The most important additions these two books provide to the theory and practice of strategy
are to its inherently relative nature and the dialogue and negotiation
that make up the development of any strategy (as well as the particular
strategies that lead to actions on the ground).
Strateg y and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty, the
last book in the trilogy, builds upon Gray’s general theory of strategy
– including the incorporation of the relative and iterative nature of strategy. In this book, however, Gray focuses on the necessity and difficulty
in planning for future security. As might be deduced from the expanded
title, Defence Planning is in large part a discussion of uncertainty – in this
case, the uncertainty that plagues attempts to plan for the future defense
of a polity.
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Three core elements of Gray’s discussion on defense planning are:
the impossibility of overcoming all uncertainty about the future when
shaping the people, processes, and technologies for defense of a nation;
as in war and strategy, it is a human endeavor and is therefore influenced
by the political and bureaucratic preferences of those involved; and, also
like war and strategy, it is an exercise in relativity – one need only be
“good enough” (better than the adversary) to be successful. Of particular interest to current efforts at shaping the Department of Defense
in our current environment is Gray’s dichotomy stemming from the
political nature of defense planning. This dichotomy details the fact that
defense planning can only be tested when employed to achieve political
effect and must have both an internal and an external consistency; all
measures at planning for the future must meet today’s domestic politics
and bureaucratic preferences (internal) and be successful when employed
against an adversary (external).
Finally, Gray spends significant space covering the importance of
historical understanding to defense planning – because this is the only
source available to ascertain patterns of behavior accurately that could
be drive human choices in the future:
“The choice of historical experience as the essential fuel for a tolerably prudent theory of defence planning is not exactly a heroic one. The
reason is that there is literally no alternative to education in history for
the preparation of contemporary defence planners.” (Strateg y and Defence
Planning, 38)
Such a focused treatment of the place of history in a defense planner
or strategist’s intellectual tool kit makes one wonder whether it should
play a larger role in the education of military and civilian leaders, whether
before service or during their career progression. The ability to pick up
a book on history belongs to any literate individual – the capability to
read history holistically, ascertain trends, and determine patterns useful
in planning for future defense scenarios is something requiring focused
education over time.
Overall, Defence Planning is an admirable addition to the theory of
strategy Gray developed in his previous two books. I recommend military and civilian leaders interested in – or likely to be involved in – the
development of strategy or the preparations for the future defense of
a polity read this remarkable trilogy, as well as study it over the course
of their careers. Each book will provide different insights and cognitive tools necessary to hold together the bridge spanning the policy and
tactics that make up strategy development and defense planning. These
books should join works like On War, the Art of War, and the History of the
Peloponnesian War as mandatory canon internalized by the military leaders
and practitioners likely to participate in the development of strategy.
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Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy
By Barry R. Posen
Reviewed by LTC Joseph Becker, Department Chair for Military Strategy at the
National Intelligence University.
The opinions expressed by this review are personal to the author and do not
imply Department of Defense endorsement.

G

rand strategy is an often controversial term in the vocabulary of
United States foreign policy. Competing visions of the US role in
global affairs lead to watered-down policy pronouncements which must
be evaluated in hindsight by their manner of implementation for a clear
interpretation. In his latest book, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand
Strategy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Barry Posen
makes such an assessment. He identifies a relatively consistent pattern of
activist behavior which he dubs a grand strategy of “Liberal Hegemony.”
This strategy, he argues, has been wasteful and counterproductive in
securing US national security interests, and he offers a competing vision
for US national security strategy. While most readers will find his arguments against Liberal Hegemony compelling, his grand strategy of
“Restraint” will be divisive on a number of levels.
Posen is clear and systematic throughout the book in defining his
terms and developing his arguments. He scopes his use of the term
grand strategy along national security lines related to the generation of
military power, avoiding potential pitfalls of debate over issues such
as public health or domestic policy. He defines liberal hegemony as a
strategy of securing the superpower position of the United States largely
through the active promotion of democracy, free markets, and Western
values worldwide. Variations of this strategy have been championed on
both sides of the political aisle by liberals and neoconservatives. His
counterproposal, Restraint, is a realist-based grand strategy which focuses
US military power on a narrow set of objectives, relies on “command of
the commons” to ensure global access, avoids entanglement in foreign
conflicts, and actively encourages allies to look to their own security.
Posen advances a largely maritime-focused strategy to command the
world’s commons.
Liberal hegemony is a strategy based upon a worldview that sees
accountable governments as safe and secure partners for perpetuating the
American way of life and non-accountable or non-existent governance
as a threat that must be managed or ultimately rectified. It encourages
a leading role for the United States in establishing and defending this
order. It is this role which Posen believes to be ill-conceived and poorly
defined, leading needlessly to wars of choice and the open-ended commitment of US forces worldwide. Posen views the current network of
US alliances and security guarantees as largely a Cold War relic, allowing
countries such as Germany, Japan, France, the Republic of Korea and
even some of the Middle Eastern oil suppliers a free ride on the US
taxpayer. He also believes that some of these commitments have encouraged reckless behavior, with Iraq and Israel as particular examples. Posen
states that, since the end of the Cold War, policymakers have consistently
exaggerated the threats to US interests in various regions of the world,
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overstated the benefits of military engagement, and embroiled the US
in a morass of identity-based conflicts with little hope for a solution. He
argues that most US allies could (and would) manage their own security
if forced to do so and they would naturally balance against threats to
regional stability and the emergence of aspiring hegemons. Also, importantly, Posen bases his arguments on the assumption that great powers
(current and emerging) will maintain a nuclear deterrence capability and
this will largely reduce the likelihood of great power wars.
The grand strategy of liberal hegemony, in the form described by
Posen, would likely have fewer supporters today than any time since the
early 1990s. There is no doubt the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the larger Global War on Terror, have been tremendously
costly in terms of blood and treasure, and their long-term benefits are
dubious. As of this writing, the Iraqi government faces mortal danger
from extremist groups. Democracy in Afghanistan is a tenuous prospect
at best. Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the recently departed director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was quoted in recent statements as
saying that even after more than 13 years of war the US is not safer and
extremist ideology is “exponentially growing.” There is little argument
that business as usual is no longer an option in US national defense.
While the status quo would seem to require a change, the level of
disengagement recommended by Posen could be problematic in ways his
book fails to explore. The network of alliances and security guarantees
maintained by the United States does more than simply abet stability
in far-flung areas of the world. The United States, as a nation, tends to
be rather opinionated as to the conduct of world affairs. While rarely
stated explicitly, security assistance in its various forms is one of the
levers used by Washington to gain influence over the decision-making
processes of other nations. A prominent example is Congress’ linking of
security assistance for Pakistan in 2011 to a concrete set of performance
objectives. It is also true that countries hosting US bases or deployments
usually reap considerable economic benefits from those arrangements
as well.
Unfortunately, balancing power is a dangerous game which does
not always lead to stability. Posen argues, for instance, the US should
remove ground forces from Japan and the Republic of Korea, believing
the South Koreans are more than a match for the North Koreans and
both Japan and the ROK will balance against China once they have to.
But what if the Japanese and the Koreans assess the threat differently
than the United States? What if one nation attempts to “buck pass” its
security preparations to another and holds out too long? Stalin did this
before World War II, expecting France to bear the cost of balancing
against Germany. When France fell, the stage was set for Hitler’s invasion of Russia.
Balancing can also have unintended consequences. Posen states,
“Restraint aims to energize other advanced industrial states into improving
their own capabilities to defend themselves…” (162) But the capability to
defend generally implies a capability to attack as well. Japan’s balancing
against China would almost certainly arouse insecurities on the Korean
peninsula, among other places. Nationalist tendencies in either location
might also encourage a state to flex its newfound muscle. Perhaps the
US can no longer afford to be the guarantor, but abandoning this role
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will relinquish a measure of control the United States maintains over
its international environment. The United States will always maintain
some responsibility to assist its allies and could be drawn into regional
conflicts whether or not it prefers.
Posen’s vision for “command of the commons” means the United
States would dominate the air, sea, and space. His treatment of space
is brief and largely sound, but he underestimates the contested nature
of this arena. Air forces are treated as essential but could be right-sized
to coincide with a reduction of ground forces. The thrust of Posen’s
argument is the United States should support its grand strategy of
Restraint through a maritime-focused force, significantly reducing the
size and priority of ground forces. In his view, the balance of power and
nuclear deterrence will reduce the likelihood of great power war, and a
reluctance to engage in smaller-scale regional conflicts will eliminate the
need for massive counterinsurgency operations and render the current
force structure irrelevant. Oddly, Posen argues for a reduction in naval
forces as well, going so far as to assess the number of aircraft carriers
in the fleet. The United States, he believes, has the economic might to
reconstitute the reduced forces if necessary, but should save its money
in the meantime.
Regardless of the reader’s views on the grand strategy of Restraint,
this book has value. Posen outlines the benefits of having a clearly
articulated grand strategy and demonstrates the pitfalls the United
States has faced in navigating national security policy without this level
of clarity. His case against becoming embroiled in conflicts requiring
counterinsurgency operations is strong. The grand strategy he proposes
is problematic for a variety of reasons, largely for the optimism of its
assumptions and its required alignment of forces. However, this work
provides a starting point for debate and a structure from which various
alternatives might be built and assessed. Posen is right that something
needs to be done differently.
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Memoirs/Biography
Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice
By John Nagl
Reviewed by Paul J. Springer, PhD, Professor of Comparative Military Studies,
Air Command and Staff College
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hat is it about colonels named John with revolutionary ideas about
how to conduct warfare and an inability to function effectively
within the existing military system? For the US Air Force, it was John
Warden and, to a lesser extent, John Boyd, who invented entirely new
concepts for aerial warfare, but who could never get out of their own
way enough to maximize the effect of their ideas. For the US Army,
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl played the same role, and it is evident in
his recent memoir, Knife Fights, that he has only partially internalized the
old cliché about capturing more flies with honey than vinegar. A West
Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar, and recipient of a PhD from Oxford
University, Nagl quickly developed a reputation as a brilliant defense
intellectual and he is accustomed to being the smartest person in the
room. Unfortunately, he at times conflates raw intelligence with subject
matter expertise, and his ego gets the better of him throughout this work.
Nagl was integral to the development of the US Army’s 21st-century
understanding of how to conduct counterinsurgency warfare, and his
first book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, has justifiably been required
reading for military leaders deployed to the long conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. His memoir offers a tremendous opportunity for insight into
the development of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, the key doctrine manual
guiding much US military decision-making in both conflicts. However,
far too much of his memoir is dedicated to settling old scores and taking
unnecessary cheap shots at people who helped him at every stage in his
career. While some degree of criticism for senior leaders’ decisions is
certainly warranted, this reviewer found Nagl’s decision to deliberately
insult the members of his first platoon completely beyond the pale. It
comes across as arrogant, demeaning, and peevish, completely unbecoming of an officer of his stature. Nagl would do well to consult Eugene B.
Sledge’s With the Old Breed for an object lesson in how to criticize fellow
service members—the insiders who served with Sledge could certainly
identify the cowards and the villains in his work, but outsiders could not
do so with any certainty.
After detailing his service in the Persian Gulf War, Nagl explains
his intellectual development at West Point, Oxford, and the Command
and General Staff College. None of those august institutions, nor their
faculty, met Nagl’s high standards, suggesting his theme for the work
will soon devolve into “If only they had listened to me.” After finishing his dissertation at Oxford, Nagl was appalled to have it rejected at
presses he considered worthy of his efforts, and he makes no friends in
the publishing community with his vicious attacks upon Praeger, the
press that eventually published his work. Even a chapter break does not
halt the assault on Praeger, who Nagl blamed for poor book sales, even
though there is little evidence he lifted a finger to help those sales.
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Chapter 3 is by far the best in the work—it is a thoughtful memoir
of his deployment in 2003-2004 to Al Anbar province, just as the
region descended into complete anarchy. There, Nagl discovered the
fundamental differences between theory and practice. The chapter is
exceptionally well-written, balanced, and offers a solid critique of his
experiences, both positive and negative, in the Iraqi desert. Sadly, it is
somewhat marred by his heavy focus upon his fellow officers—even
though NCOs and enlisted personnel bore the brunt of the casualties
under his command, there is little evidence Nagl knew much about
them, and he has little to offer about their contributions and sacrifices,
leaving the distinct impression they had little influence upon the war.
In Chapter 4, Nagl turns his attention to the genesis of FM 3-24,
but once again, his petty attacks significantly influence the value of his
discussion. He goes to great lengths to inform the reader that Conrad
Crane was the second choice to lead the writing effort, although to
Nagl’s credit, he eventually admits that Crane, a self-effacing academic if
ever there was one, was the better choice for the role. Additional insults
are lobbed at senior civilian and military leaders, including some who
significantly aided Nagl’s career. In pursuit of said career, Nagl relates a
tale of essentially selling out his co-author, Paul Yingling, for the sake
of his own promotion opportunities, a move that paid no dividends.
Perhaps that is why he passionately attacks the promotion system’s
failure to elevate his choice of leaders, while at the same time demonstrating how often the process was circumvented by aspirants with
powerful benefactors.
By Chapter 6, Nagl’s story has worn thin—he presents himself as
one of the central architects of the strategy applied in Iraq in 2006,
and yet, David Petraeus elected to leave Nagl commanding a training
battalion in Kansas rather than bring him into the inner circle as he
did with so many other promising officers. Nagl offers an outsider’s
summary of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, but probably should have
focused instead upon his own role and how his unit performed in its
“train the trainers” mission. It is clear Nagl offered a verbal summary of
his dissertation to the officers who regularly rotated through his training
course, it is not so obvious what else was accomplished by his unit.
Chapter 8 stands out as Nagl’s chance to offer advice on how the
military should conduct its affairs in the future, and is another shining
example of what happens when he turns his formidable intellect upon a
challenging problem. He comes to many of the same conclusions as have
other prominent defense analysts, namely, US conventional dominance
and nuclear deterrence make irregular warfare the only viable option
for any opponent seeking to fight the United States or its allies. This
chapter would benefit from offering a bit more guidance regarding the
key works an interested reader should consult for more information, as
the extremely truncated bibliography hits a few of the obvious highlights, but barely scratches the surface of good works currently available.
Overall, this memoir has some unique insights, particularly regarding the need for, creation of, and resistance to a new counterinsurgency
doctrine. Unfortunately, the author’s often-cutting style, relentless selfpromotion, and continual name-dropping severely undercuts the final
work. Nagl’s perspective is reminiscent of Cassandra of Greek mythology—an oracle with unfailing accuracy, but doomed to be disbelieved
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by all who heard her prophecies. Perhaps Cassandra, and John Nagl,
would have won over more believers had they been able to present their
predictions in a less caustic fashion. This book is a worthy addition
to the shelf for any consumer of war memoirs, any student of military
doctrine, or a scholar interested in the development of modern counterinsurgency theories. Its flashes of greatness outweigh its negatives, but
much like the war in Iraq, it could have been so much more successful
with a better execution of a well thought-out plan.

The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National
Security
By Bartholomew Sparrow
Reviewed by Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

F
New York, NY:
PublicAffairs, 2015
752 pages
$34.99

ew people have influenced US national security policy as much as
Brent Scowcroft. Some luminaries burned more brightly – Henry
Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski come to mind – but their time in the
spotlight was shorter. Scowcroft was a senior policy maker in both the
Ford and George H.W. Bush administrations, and an influential figure in
Washington policy circles between and after his stints in the White House.
And he was there for some of the most seminal events in American
history including the final collapse of South Vietnam and the end of the
Cold War. As Bartholomew Sparrow puts in The Strategist, his massive
new authorized biography of Scowcroft, “…no other official or analyst
has consistently had such a profound impact on the national security
policy of the United States. For many in Washington, Brent Scowcroft
is a pillar of the foreign policy community and a global strategist par
excellence.” (xii)
Capturing a career of this magnitude is an ambitious undertaking so Sparrow’s book includes well over 500 pages of primary text.
It draws deeply from both secondary and primary material – including Scowcroft’s personal files – as well as extensive interviews with
Scowcroft himself and dozens of his colleagues and associates, many of
them central architects of American security policy.
Sparrow’s admiration for Scowcroft is evident on every page. At
times it tips so far toward imbalance that it detracts from the power of
the book: the author consistently gave Scowcroft credit for everything
that worked out well and absolves him of responsibility for what might
seem to be missteps. For instance, when recounting components of the
Bush policy that were less than successful or outright failures such as
Afghanistan and Yugoslavia, Scowcroft recedes into the background.
On successful endeavors such as the Bush administration’s response to
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he moves to the fore as when Sparrow
argues that Scowcroft “Almost single handedly…determined what the
United States’ response to the invasion of Kuwait was going to be” (385).
Still, there is much to be drawn from this impressive book. Two
questions are particularly important. Sparrow places great stress on the
idea that Scowcroft is the model of a national security adviser, combining a detailed grasp of complex issues with realism, pragmatism and a
willingness to work behind the scenes rather than hogging the limelight.

Book Reviews: Memoirs/Biography

145

Sparrow notes George H.W. Bush described Scowcroft as “the perfect
national security advisor. He’s an honest broker, yet has strong opinions
of his own.” (488) “He believes in working with other influential people
out of public view,” Sparrow wrote, “Somewhat wary of Congress,
skeptical of the media, and uncertain about the wisdom of the public,
he believes in a security policy made by mandarins – a hierarchical
approach…” (559)
If this is accurate, the question is how the United States can routinely find such people. It is not a coincidence that Scowcroft and Colin
Powell, who had some of the same attributes, came out of the military.
Is the answer that the National Security Adviser should routinely come
from the senior ranks of the military? That has some appeal but also
profound implications for civil military relations. As illustrated by the
tenure of retired Marine General James L. Jones as Barrack Obama’s
national security adviser shows, success in uniform does not always
translate into success at the National Security Council.
A second important question – and one Sparrow addresses more
directly – is whether Scowcroft’s brand of pragmatic realism is still as
relevant today as it was during the Cold War. During Scowcroft’s time
in office, the global security system was very much state centric. The
conflict with the Soviet Union had matured to the point that it was possible to craft a working consensus among Americans and their elected
leaders that allowed things to get done. Today’s security system is very
different. Violent transnational networks, both ideological and criminal,
may not have fully surpassed other nations as security threats, but they
are at least co-equal.
Domestically, the Cold War idea that partisanship should at least
be muted in national security policy has collapsed. Instead, there is
hyperpartisanship driven by a new form of populism created by the
Internet, 24 hour news, and talk radio. This new populism has now
spilled over into relations between the Executive Branch and Congress,
making national security policy simply one more battleground for partisan political conflict. It is not clear whether a national security adviser
like Scowcroft, who deliberately kept a distance from partisan squabbles,
could be effective in this complex, dangerous new political climate. It
may be that he was the perfect national security adviser for the final
years of the Cold War but not a model for the future.
In any case, Sparrow’s magisterial book provides an invaluable
picture of an important era in US national security policy and lays a
foundation for talking about America’s future even if it does not attempt
to provide a roadmap for it.
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Asia
Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable
Pacific
By Robert Kaplan
Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation
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House, 2014
225 pages
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he South China Sea has rocketed into the headlines in recent years
spawning a cottage industry of instant experts proffering alarmist
commentary and provocatively titled volumes. Tensions in maritime
Southeast Asia have been on a slow boil since at least 2010, but whether
the South China Sea merits the label of “Asia’s cauldron” is debatable.
Kaplan is prone to hyperbole, but he has done his homework and is no
neophyte when it comes to the Asian littoral (he is also the author of
Monsoon — a geostrategic examination of the Indian Ocean published
in 2010).
Kaplan is right on target when he underscores the importance of
the South China Sea to the wider region describing it “as central to
Asia as the Mediterranean is to Europe.” (49) Using colorful anatomical
terminology he describes this body of water as the “throat” connecting two oceans — the Pacific and Indian. (9) The South China Sea is
certainly a major maritime thoroughfare crisscrossed by a spider’s web
of sea lanes. But is it accurate for Kaplan to identify this semi-enclosed
sea as “a principal node of global power politics”? (49) If “global power
politics” is used as a synonym for geostrategic competition between the
United States and China, then the answer is “yes.”
However, many in the United States and elsewhere insist the tensions in the South China Sea are not about “power politics;” rather (for
many in Washington and other capitals), what is under threat is the
sacrosanct principle of freedom of navigation. Arguably, the real issue
is which great power or set of powers will guarantee this principle now
and for the foreseeable future, and whose interpretation of freedom of
navigation will be observed in this body of water.
But for many in China the issue is Beijing’s territorial claims over
many islands, reefs, atolls and associated waters in the South China Sea.
These claims tend to be made on the basis of a purported historical
record of Chinese presence and activity in the area as well as China’s
interpretations of international law. And many Chinese view highminded US rhetoric about the sanctity of freedom of navigation as a ruse
to justify continued geostrategic meddling and invasive military activity
in Beijing’s maritime backyard. The author suggests China’s approach
to the South China Sea is “akin” to America’s Monroe Doctrine in the
Caribbean Basin. (13) However, as Kaplan observes, this parallel has its
limits. An important difference is Washington never made territorial
claims to all the islands and waters of the Caribbean; rather, the United
States asserted a sphere of influence. This is not to say Washington hasn’t
muscularly asserted itself in this region over the years, but rather the
United States never asserted sovereignty on the basis of historical claims.
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The heart of the book is contained in the first two chapters which
address the South China Sea’s significance to China and the rest of the
world. While Asia’s Cauldron book does not add much beyond what
has already been written about the South China Sea itself, Kaplan’s
astute broader geostrategic analysis is well worth the price of admission. Discussion of this body of water becomes a launching pad to raise
larger, uncomfortable questions about the future trajectory of US-China
interactions in East Asia and the Western Pacific.
The strategy of other claimants to the land formations and associated waters to counter Chinese pressure tactics is to push the United
States to remain engaged in Southeast Asia while avoiding an escalation of tensions to actual military conflict or to the point of forcing the
capitals of the region to choose Beijing or Washington. Understanding
how these other claimants and interested parties play is important and
Kaplan does make efforts in this regard. Unfortunately, too much of
the book — six of its eight chapters — is crammed with perceptive but
peripheral geopolitical travelogue of the states surrounding the South
China Sea. Much of this discussion — successive chapters on Vietnam,
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, and China — does little
to illuminate the roles each of these actors play in the South China Sea
slow boil drama.
These shortcomings aside, Asia’s Cauldron is recommended reading
for national security communities all along the Pacific Rim and around
the world.

The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strategy: Ensuring Access and
Promoting Security
By Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner, editors
Reviewed by Larry A. Grant, CDR USN (ret.), Research Associate at The Citadel
Oral History Program and Adjunct Professor, Charleston, SC

T

he history of America’s relationship to the world’s oceans and seas
began with the crossing of the Atlantic Ocean. American interest
spread following independence to the Mediterranean Sea when North
African pirates tested the young republic. The growth of the China
trade and the movement of the nation westward to the Pacific expanded
American horizons yet again, but the Indian Ocean did not assume a
similar level of importance to the United States as these others until
long after World War II. It caught strategists’ attention only belatedly
and almost entirely as a consequence of the need to protect the flow of
Middle Eastern oil and in reaction to Soviet advances in those waters.
According to Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner in The Indian
Ocean and US Grand Strategy it is time that negligent attitude toward this
important body of water and its surrounding nations changed.
This book explores the same general territory mapped out by Robert
D. Kaplan’s Monsoon in 2010. Kaplan wrote; “It is my contention that the
Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past
the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent,
all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a
map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.” (xi)

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2014
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The formerly slighted Indian Ocean is, in Kaplan’s view, on the verge
of becoming a new international strategic locus for the United States.
This prediction and the concomitant requirement to make prudent
national strategic preparations for the consequences that would follow
from its realization provide the thematic framework for the collection
of essays that make up The Indian Ocean and US Grand Strateg y. Editors
Dombrowski and Winner argue in their introduction that the rise of
the Indian Ocean as a trade route and potential battleground elicits
“questions about whether, and how, American policymakers should
adjust their previously limited approach to the region.” (2) The required
information for this reassessment according to the editors includes: 1) a
determination of US interests in the region; 2) a grasp of the geopolitical
characteristics of the region and their dynamics; and 3) the development
of mechanisms by which the interests of the US can be furthered.
The editors argue there are significant risks even in maintaining
the status quo. In light of recent events, perhaps the most compelling
of those discussed is that “allies and partners in the region may perceive the status quo or a slight decline in US defense activities...due to
the Afghanistan and Iraq drawdown as Washington pulling back more
broadly. This may result in more aggressive behavior on the part of
adversaries…” (11) (If the chaos there is evidence, this last prediction
seems to have been realized in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq and may suggest
that the decline in US influence is already underway). The editors accept
the Obama administration’s proposed “Asian pivot” as a potential step
in the right direction, but they also point out that it does not include a
specific strategy for the Indian Ocean. They return to this deficiency in
their concluding chapter, offering the “beginnings of an analytic framework for evaluating the contending strategic approaches offered” by the
authors of the other essays. Their unsurprising conclusion is the United
States would benefit from a coherent Indian Ocean strategy.
The editors’ introductory and concluding chapters bookend essays
by eight other scholars offering varying assessments of the need for
American engagement and the methods through which America’s geopolitical future in the region ought to be pursued. The second through
seventh of the essays examine various strategic options, and essays eight
and nine track the possible paths of evolution of recent policies into
the future. All of the authors are either scholars or foreign service professionals with backgrounds in strategy, political science, or Asian or
Pacific affairs.
Strategic speculation like that contained in The Indian Ocean and US
Grand Strateg y often makes for interesting reading assuming one can
decipher the sometimes dense prose. However, the likelihood of any
of the suggested Indian Ocean strategies receiving a serious trial in the
near future seems small as long as other concerns continue to take center
stage. For example, future China policy will undoubtedly include an
Indian Ocean component, but of more immediate interest is China’s
advancing “Great Wall of Sand” as some are calling China’s island
hopping and building program in disputed South China Sea waters, and
her growing influence in an area that is home to important American
allies. Chinese encroachments there will not wane soon and will capture
much of America’s limited resources before they can reach the Indian
Ocean.
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If some of those resources do pass through into the Indian Ocean,
it will almost certainly be en route to the Middle East. There they will
continue to go so long as the Middle East – where it could be argued the
United States has long had and is now watching the decline of the sort of
regional policy these authors advocate for the Indian Ocean – continues
in its currently chaotic state. Perhaps that crumbling structure, which
might be thought of as a policy under real-world review, ought to be
repaired before moving on to other regions.
Prudent contingency scholarship and planning – like scientific
exploration – always has value, even though it may not be realized until
long afterward. At present, however budget pressures may keep the realization of an Indian Ocean regional strategy consigned to the academic
seminar for room.

The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to
Replace America as the Global Superpower
By Michael Pillsbury
Reviewed by Timothy L. Thomas, senior analyst at TRADOC’s Foreign Military
Studies Office. He has written extensively on Chinese cyber issues and
strategy.

A

uthor Michael Pillsbury’s book The Hundred-Year Marathon, which is
about China’s quest to become the world’s primary superpower by
2049 (the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China), contains
three key elements. First, this book is unique in that, with regard to China’s
geopolitical strategy, it attempts to weave two important elements of
Chinese historical and cultural thought, namely the use of stratagems and
the concept of shi (how to attain a strategic advantage over an opponent),
throughout the entire narrative. Pillsbury relies extensively on writings
and strategic lessons learned from the Warring States period, stating, “I
learned that the Warring States mind-set has long been dominant among
China’s leaders.” Pillsbury stresses that hawks have “persuaded the
Chinese leadership to view America as a dangerous hegemon that it must
replace.” Other works on Chinese strategy typically move away from this
emphasis, making the analysis feel less “Chinese” and more “Western.”
Second, Pillsbury offers readers several insights regarding his personal history that indicate the extensive depth of his knowledge and
why his book has to be taken seriously. His information comes from his
access to classified sources (where the shi concept was mentioned often,
he writes), personal interviews among a host of primary sources in China
(to include former leader Deng Xiaoping), and access to Chinese defectors. His ability to read and speak Mandarin, access to such sources, and
his work with the Central Intelligence Agency, and his role as a policy
advisor were also important.
Third, Pillsbury’s book, perhaps unintentionally, may long serve
as a primer for aspiring Chinese analysts. He offers educators several
areas where they should direct their attention. For example, he lists the
nine principal elements of Chinese strategy that form the basis of the
Hundred-Year Marathon, and in the conclusion of the book he lists concepts the United States can adopt from China’s Warring States era to
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offset or counter China’s strategic aims. Further, to insure analysts are
not taken in by Chinese claims the United States is nothing more than a
global hegemon or a great Satan, he explains in some detail how much
assistance America has provided China over the years, in economic,
diplomatic, and military terms.
In spite of these extensive friendly gestures on the part of the United
States, China looks at US assistance (through its prism of skepticism and
suspicion) as part of an overall stratagem against China. It continues to
harbor concerns the United States is out to humiliate China. Perhaps
this is merely a case of how China has learned to view the world through
the Warring States template, where power politics, intrigue, deception,
and open warfare existed side by side. Or perhaps this is simply the case
with autocratic regimes, as we often hear the same claims of humiliation
from Russia’s current leadership, even though they have been offered
extensive assistance through the years. The assistance was clearly not
intentioned to exert “dominance” over Russia, rather, it helped Russia
get back on its feet. The United States simply does not have the desire,
budget, forces, or strategy to dominate strategic giants such as Russia
and China.
The book has a few shortcomings. For example, it would have been
informative for Pillsbury to access and report on the context of some
of the People’s Liberation Army’s more recent strategic works beyond
the Science of Military Strateg y (2001). It is important to know if Pillsbury’s
continued references to the Warring States period are still in vogue. Or
are we seeing more creative input in concert with President Xi Jinping’s
“China Dream?” When Pillsbury asks whether we are continuing to
“unwittingly assist in the challenger’s ascendance,” important responses
are required from the perspective of strategy. Analysts, independent of
their level of experience, should carefully weigh the lessons Pillsbury
has learned. The responses of a new generation of strategists to such
questions as “whether we are assisting the Chinese” will shape our
future meaningful engagement with China. Books like Pillsbury’s will
be important to their assessment processes.

Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters
By Bernard D. Cole
Reviewed by Richard Halloran, formerly with The New York Times as a foreign
correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in Washington, DC

T
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013
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his book is a primer on the strategically vital, internationally complicated, and potentially explosive region running from the Yellow Sea
through the Straits of Malacca to the western Indian Ocean. The study
moves on known headings, with few discoveries, as it seeks to help those
unfamiliar with these turbulent waters.
The author, Bernard D. Cole, is a retired Navy captain who was
skipper of a frigate and commodore of a destroyer squadron. As an
academic, he earned a PhD in history from Auburn University, has specialized in Asian naval issues, and teaches at the National War College
in Washington DC.
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Early on, the author points to the “essentially maritime character”
of the region, then bit by bit acknowledges the basically continental
orientation of Asian nations throughout history. Today, he writes: “Few
Asian nations have coherent maritime strategies or ocean policies that
reflect both truly vital national interests and defense-budget realities.”
Cole says Western nations have been influenced by the famed
US naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, British strategist Sir Julian S.
Corbett, and French naval officer Theophile Aube. But he does not
name an Asian counterpart, and neither Sun Tzu nor other classical
Chinese strategists have much to say about seapower.
Indeed, from 1498 when the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama
landed in India, Asian nations were notable for their lack of naval power
to fend off European, Russian, and American seaborne incursions. By
the mid-twentieth century, foreign flags flew over all but three Asian
nations: Japan, Thailand, and Nepal.
Two exceptions to this absence of seapower: A Chinese admiral,
Zheng He (sometimes written Cheng Ho), led several exploratory
voyages through the South China Sea and across the Indian Ocean in
the fifteenth century. But China’s imperial rulers, as Cole points out, lost
interest after that.
Japan responded to the arrival of American and Russian warships
in the 1850’s by building a navy strong enough to defeat Russia at sea
in 1905 and to attack the US fleet in Pearl Harbor in 1941. But during
World War II, Japan lost 3,032 warships and commercial ships and was
left with little afloat.
Thus, Asian seapower is largely a product of the postwar period
in which Asians have built navies from the keel up. China’s plans have
been the most ambitious, but Beijing had to resort to getting a People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) general, Liu Huaqing, to change into a naval
uniform to begin assembling a fleet. (The PLA comprises all of China’s
armed forces.)
Liu, Cole writes, “made his mark as the country’s most influential
modern flag officer” in the 1980s. His plans were based on three phases
that reflected his thinking as a soldier whose armies operate along lines
of defense, advance, and logistics.
By 2000, Liu’s navy would be able to defend waters from the coastline to what he saw as “the first island chain” running from northern
Japan south through the Philippines to Indonesia. By 2020, the Chinese
navy should be able to defend farther east, to “the second island” chain
running from Japan through the Mariannas to Indonesia. “Finally,”
Cole concludes, “by 2050, the PLAN (PLA Navy) would possess aircraft
carriers and have the capacity to operate globally.”
For the moment, Cole asserts, Japan has a better navy: “It is the
most capable maritime force in East Asia. It is not as large as China’s
navy but it is more technology-intensive, more experienced, and more
highly trained.” He argues Japan’s naval strategy has gradually shifted
“from a narrowly focused defense of the home islands to a global focus.”
However, Cole contends: “National policy makers in Tokyo during
the past decade or more have failed to acknowledge this maritime
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dependence; they have not adequately funded the armed service most
crucial to Japan’s national security.”
India reflects the experience of many Asian nations in shedding
colonial rule, in this case from Britain in 1947, soon to begin assembling
an armed force, including a navy. As Cole notes: “It is no exaggeration
to say that Indian maritime strategists take the name ‘Indian Ocean’
literally.”
Cole reports that India’s 55,000 sailors, a relatively small number,
man “an impressive fleet” that includes two aircraft carriers. The author
reports that India’s naval leaders appear to realize that their force is not
capable of going “one on one” against the Chinese. Hence, India has
sought to forge “strong relations with other navies, particularly those of
the United States, Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam.”
Asian Maritime Strategies, while valuable, is marred by several questionable contentions. A sampling:
The author asserts that John Lehman, who served in the Reagan
Administration “was almost unquestionably the most strategically minded
Secretary of the Navy in US history.” Yet Mr. Lehman was distinctly controversial and was reined in by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger for
overstepping his authority.

Some 44,000 American sailors are deployed at sea on half the fleet’s
288 ships on any given day, Cole says. A few pages later, an admiral is
quoted as saying 50,000 sailors are underway on 145 of the fleet’s 285
ships. Not a big difference but a good editor should have insisted that
those numbers be reconciled.
In Japan, Cole says, the Japanese government “pays most of the
costs” of US warships based there. That is overstated as the Japanese
cover the yen costs—shipyard workers, guards, rent—while the US pays
considerably more for the ships, their operations and maintenance, and
the pay and allowances of the crew.
In Australia, the author says, US Marines are establishing a base. In
fact, the Marines are rotating through Australian army training areas.
Similarly, he writes that US ships will be homeported in Singapore when
they are being rotated there for a six months at a time. Politically, rotating troops through someone else’s training grounds or ships through a
host nation’s piers and setting up a base or port are quite different.
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Modern Soldiers
The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the
Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries
By Anthony King
Reviewed by George J. Woods, III, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor of Strategic
Leadership, US Army War College

A

fter more than a decade of continuous conflict, Anthony King, a
Cambridge graduate and professor of sociology at Exeter University,
authored a superb and in-depth look at today’s soldiers. King’s research
passion, the examination of the sociological phenomenon “collective
action”—how and why groups form and sustain themselves—ranges
from sports teams to the military. In The Combat Soldier, King meticulously “explores how cohesion and combat performance, often assumed
unchanging and universal across wars, may have changed in the course
of the last century, as armies have moved away from the citizen towards
the all-volunteer professional model.” (39)
King examines how armies in Western-like, democratic societies
behave and maintain cohesion in the face of the hellish experience of
combat. He does so by deftly analyzing how the “multiplicity of factors
including comradeship, political motivation, doctrine, tactics, and training (39)” affected combat performance in battle from World War I to
the present. Rather than a macro perspective, he studies the phenomenon from the grassroots level using the infantry platoon as his unit
of analysis to identify what motivates these soldiers to act in unison in
a combat environment. His method includes comparing citizen army
platoons from World War I to Vietnam against the modern, professional army platoons which have fought from the Falklands to the most
recent operations in Afghanistan. By design, his emphasis focuses on
six armies: Australia; Canada; France; Germany; the United Kingdom;
and the United States, and applicable infantry platoons from their
marine ground units. Precise definitions and disciplined social science
methodologies aid King’s objectivity in analyzing the conditions affecting combat performance. Consequently, he challenges commonly held
notions of citizen armies, both positive and negative, in comparing their
performance across countries and wars to make his findings more comparable and generalizable.
S.L.A. Marshall’s research based on 30 years of study on combat
soldiers serves as King’s starting point. Marshall, widely regarded as the
expert on soldiers in combat, came under attack over the past 25 years.
Criticisms cast doubt on his methodology and objectivity, discrediting
the findings in his seminal work, Men against Fire. While addressing criticisms of Marshall’s research, King examines and defends the essence of
Marshall’s surprising and controversial findings—one in four combat
soldiers actually fired weapons in battle. In the chapter, “The Marshall
Effect,” King reestablishes the efficacy of Marshall’s work and uses
it to serve as his foundation for exploring the differences in combat
performance between citizen armies of the twentieth century and
professional armies of the current century. King explains how armies
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formerly appealed to “masculine honour, nationalism, ethnicity and
patriotic duty” (97) to inspire soldiers to fight in the citizen armies of
the 20th century. However, he argues new factors have emerged, as a
result of the shift from mass to modern tactics due largely to advances
in technology and the changing nature of modern warfare. Such factors
account for significant increases in the effectiveness of today’s combat
soldier—a direct result of the shift to all-volunteer, professionalized
armies. King contends the technical and tactical expertise of matured
all-volunteer professional armies (inclusive of both commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, and probably veteran soldiers) was developed and sustained through rigorous training. Expertise in individual
skills contributing to synchronous collective action has become the
dominant factor in determining platoon combat effectiveness. King
defines effectiveness as how well these “groups [platoons] generate accurate and effective fire on the battlefield with their personal weapons”
(38) or, in today’s counterinsurgency environment, “the privilege of not
firing because it [the platoon] has positioned itself in a way where it overmatches its opponent so thoroughly that resistance is plainly futile.” (38)
King’s comprehensive and detailed explanation of how today’s armies
conduct training through drills and rehearsals is persuasive.
In his final chapter, King examines a significant issue confronting
the US military today –the integration of women into the infantry. He
provides a balanced and comprehensive treatment of this issue. Although
he does not offer specific answers, recommendations, or methods by
which the decision should or could be implemented, he does provide
a different frame of reference through which to consider the issue and
evaluate possible ways to achieve the desired end.
In reading King’s book, I reflected on whom would most benefit
from reading it. Historians and sociologists would find his book a fascinating in-depth exploration to inform their views and put today’s combat
experience into an historical perspective. For military professionals, the
book is most relevant for today’s infantry officer. Though written by an
accomplished academic, King’s thorough analysis and research, complemented by expert testimonials, makes the book readable while advancing
a meticulous and compelling argument. In particular, King’s descriptions of current infantry platoon training in various armies provide an
informative and cross-sectional view. He implicitly communicates the
vital role commanders and trainers from company to division level play
indirectly in combat infantry platoon development.
Other military officers may find value in King’s work in drawing
parallels with either their own branches of service (air and naval) or
branch within the ground forces (armor, artillery, etc.) identifying the
factors driving their own “collective action” and informing their own
professional expertise. They would also gain a broader appreciation for
what makes combat soldiers effective on today’s battlefield. From the
service chief or combatant commander perspective, especially in these
times of fiscal austerity and unpredictability, the important role they play
in advocating for funding to resource training and readiness emerges.
Although an outcome less tangible than those compared to monies
spent on modernization (platforms) and personnel (end strength), King
provides compelling justification as to why readiness should be fiscally
resourced on par with, if not more than, the other two—if a credible
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combat land force is to be preserved. Having the best equipment in
the hands of individuals alone is insufficient to make an army effective.
King reaffirms, above all, readiness is what makes combat soldiers effective in battle.

Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign for Universal Military
Training after World War II
By William A. Taylor
Reviewed by COL (Ret) Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural
Studies, US Army War College

A

s the American profession of arms seeks to reclaim its identity, it
is encouraging to see the emergence of warrior-scholars. William
Taylor is one, as an Annapolis graduate and former US Marine Corps
officer who transitioned back into civilian society to pursue a career in
academia. In Every Citizen a Soldier, Taylor appropriately examines familiar
terrain – the US policy formulation process to address postwar national
security through the preparedness of its military force to protect American
interests. Ostensibly, his thesis is the US military’s drive to reduce the time
to prepare individuals and units for war through a program of universal
military training was subverted by political and social agendas.
For this reviewer, such an examination is particularly timely as the
United States marks more than forty years since the end of conscription
and the inception of the All-Volunteer Force with the termination of the
Vietnam War. Since that conflict the US has been engaged in numerous
military operations across the globe—from the heightened Cold War
and a series of contingency of operations (Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and
Kosovo) to the hybrid conflicts of the global war on terror spanning the
range of military operations. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin Dempsey recasts the National Military Strategy with his
focus on readiness, force structure, and modernization. Arguably, the
latter two enable readiness of the joint force to fulfill missions directed
by civilian officials in the White House and on Capitol Hill.
Taylor provides the context of experiences of the Second War World,
which weighed heavily in the American psyche, especially as the nation
imagined global threats could emerge after the Allied victory in 1945.
During the war, it was apparent, as Taylor clearly presents, American
society reconnected with its values and the national leadership held its
citizenry responsible in supporting the war. He describes the three-fold
challenges faced after the war: balancing national interests with individual liberty; determining the role of universal military training (UMT)
and its impact on groups within American society; and defining the
relationship of citizenry to its military.
Taylor provides a well-explicated precursor to the UMT efforts.
Military historians will be familiar with the post-First World War
Plattsburg Movement where American students and businessmen
volunteered for basic military training under the command of thenformer Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood. The movement’s
success greatly influenced Wood and future generals whom he mentored—George C. Marshall and John Palmer—both who became the
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foremost uniformed advocates for UMT. This legacy of the First World
War became the National Defense Act of 1920, which reorganized the
General Reserve (including the National Guard). However, a critical
provision for compulsory military training of males between the ages
of 18 and 21 was dropped from the bill. In hopes the world would not
brook another conflict of a scale as the Great War, the United States
followed George Washington’s imperative for a “respectably defensive
posture” (22) with a small standing army and reliance on mobilizing its
citizenry for military operations.
Embroiled in the Second World War in 1944, Army Chief of Staff
General Marshall signed War Department Circular No. 347 to make
UMT “the primary goal of the army’s postwar establishment.” (29) To
Marshall, UMT was essential in developing military leaders, informing public opinion on military matters, minimizing the expense of a
large standing army, and aligning democratic traditions with civilian
participation in defense and a small standing force. Above all, Marshall
and other uniformed advocates saw UMT as the way to improve military
effectiveness.
It is easy to use contemporary professional vocabulary to frame the
Army effort as a military campaign in its design, planning, and demonstration of a UMT program. The Army chief of staff provided the
vision and strategic direction. The general staff performed estimates
of friendly and opposing forces. Together, they developed concept of
operations, and “scheme of maneuver” with lines of operation. It was
clear to military leaders of the time that readiness of the force was absolutely essential for national security. In an Army that grew from 400,000
to 5.4 million between 1938 to 1942, it was important to shorten the
time to train individuals and units for future wars. The Army identified
early on supportive stakeholders, called “Friendlies”—as well as opposition groups to UMT. For this reviewer, the chapter “Pig in a Poke”
was especially intriguing and illuminating in presenting the concerns
of leaders from, labor, religious, pacifist, and minority groups. These
groups clearly identified that military necessity had direct and, from
their perspectives, undesirable consequences for American society.
In today’s vernacular, the lines of operation included communication synchronization and strategic messaging across the War Department
where senior officers were “on message” and set about to inform, shape,
and build support for UMT in the public sector. Clearly, the goal was
to build a constituency capable of influencing policy development. Not
surprisingly, members of Congress levied charges of impropriety in
civil-military relations against the War Department.
Taylor’s analysis reveals, while senior military leaders had a very
specific conception of UMT, President Truman had a broader vision
for UMT as an instrument to shape American society. Shades of
Clausewitz—in other words, the military instrument was adapted and
subordinated to policy. In response, the military fiercely resisted changes
to the core design of its program. The UMT’s essential elements were
to select men meeting entrance requirements, and train them to achieve
individual and collective skills thereby effectively contributing to unit
readiness. As Taylor contends, perhaps the fatal flaw inherent in the
UMT structure was the maintenance of racial segregation for the sake
of military effectiveness.
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Elements of the UMT discourse foreshadow contemporary discussions of the US military and the Army. One can easily envision similar
internal debates on Department of Defense force structure and capabilities needed to protect national security interests in an environment
of global threats and domestic fiscal challenges. I expect the drive to
develop the narrative for Strategic Landpower had similar elements of
campaign design with its intent, lines of operations, and messaging.
Despite the advocacy of iconic strategic leaders like President Truman
and General Marshall, UMT was not enacted (defeated in 1948) and
selective service was reauthorized by Congress in the summer of 1951.
Subsequently, “large segments of American society remained untouched
by military service.” (167) Again, the military necessity so clear to Army
leaders did not resonate with civilians in the Executive and Legislative
Branches. Other priorities subordinated the military instrument to
civilian-derived policy.
Taylor has produced an immensely informative and insightful
book for senior military professionals. His concluding chapter captures
the critical responsibility of strategic leadership: “Senior army leaders
grappled with the daunting challenge of crafting a postwar policy in the
face of great uncertainty. Even as battles…still raged, they attempted
to create a viable army that would stand the test of the unknown and
be well suited to a democracy.” (168) Such challenges endure for our
military leaders of today and Taylor’s work serves as important contribution to understanding the nature of policy formulation for the security
of the Republic.
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Irregular Fighters
The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of
the Middle East
By Loretta Napoleoni
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations
and Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University and Visiting Research
Professor at the US Army War College
New York, NY: Seven
Stories Press, 2014
160 pages
$11.95

S

ince its inception in June 2014 when ISIS released a statement
announcing the establishment of the Caliphate, not a single day
has passed without the media reporting some activity by this notorious extremist organization. For example, the British weekly magazine
The Economist reported that ISIS is spreading fear, but is losing ground.
(March 21-27, 2015) The Christian Science Monitor Weekly reported ISIS
is sophisticated, lethal and growing in numbers, but will not become a
global force. (March 30, 2015) Some reporters treat ISIS as just another
annoyance, while others question the ability of the West to deal with
this new brand of terrorist organization effectively. No matter how
the media treat ISIS, one important thing must be kept in mind: in the
post-World War II period, no armed group has ever carved out such a
large territory. It is an armed organization “redesigning the map of the
Middle East drawn by the French and the British” with the Sykes-Picot
Accord of 1946. In her book, The Islamist Phoenix, Loretta Napoleoni
argues that, while the Western media treats ISIS as little more than a gang
of thugs on a winning streak, the organization is proposing a new model
of nation-building that relies on globalization and modern technology.
(xiv) According to Napoleoni, ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
are viewed by many Sunnis in Iraq as an Islamist phoenix risen from the
ashes of Abu Musab al Zarqawi’s jihad. (14)
ISIS’s spiritual leader, al Baghdadi, presents himself to members of
the Caliphate as a man with honorable qualities, and traces his lineage to
the Prophet Mohammad. In one of his official appearance after being
elected Caliph, al Baghdadi spoke inside the Grand Mosque of Mosul
dressed in the traditional attire of an imam. (16) In his speech to his
followers, al Baghdadi shows himself as “a wise and pragmatic” religious
leader telling them, “I am the wali [leader] who presides over you, though
I am not the best of you, so if you see that I am right, assist me. If
you see that I am wrong, advise me and put me on the right track, and
obey me as long as I obey God in you.” (17) Al Baghdadi also portrays
ISIS to its followers (and the world) not as the monstrous organization
represented by the Western media. Instead, al Baghdadi presents ISIS as
a legitimate organization fighting the alliance between corrupted Muslim
elites in the Middle East and Western powers. (78) Therefore, al Baghdadi
has said “those who can immigrate to the Islamic State should immigrate,
as immigration to the house of Islam is a duty.” (76) He also called upon
all Muslims to join the Caliphate to reconnect with their roots. This call
also served as a means of creating Arab identity. An integral part of al
Baghdadi’s mission is the purification of Islam, which is to be accomplished via Salafism. Salafism doctrine calls for all Muslims to go back
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to the purity of religion, to the origins of Islam and the teachings of the
Prophet. (85)
Another important element of al Baghdadi as the Islamist phoenix
is his appeal to geography. (81) As Robert D. Kaplan has written in
The Revenge of Geography, “geography informs, rather than determines.
Geography, therefore, is not synonymous with fatalism. But it is, like the
distribution of economic and military power themselves, a major constraint on – and instigator of – the actions of states.” (29) In the case of
the Islamic State, al Baghdadi and ISIS attempt to rebuild the Caliphate
in Syria and Iraq is linked to their belief that this is an area where God’s
judgment will come to pass. Also, geography has always been essential
to Islam – both religiously and politically. (81) The Islamic State and al
Baghdadi are also actively involved in the globalization of world politics.
Rather than rejecting modernity, its leadership shows an unparalleled
grasp of the limitations facing contemporary powers in globalized and
multipolar world. (xiv) ISIS has been able to use technology to spread
its messages and promote its cause, linking them to the world news. For
example, one of ISIS’s more successful ventures “is an Arabic-language
Twitter app called The Dawn of Glad Tidings, or just Dawn. The app,
an official ISIS product promoted by its top users, is advertised as a way
to keep up on the latest news about the jihadi group.” (63) Unlike the
Taliban or al Qaeda which rejected music, technology, dancing, etc., ISIS
has not only embraced them, but also put them to use to advance its
cause very successfully.
In conclusion, the Islamic State’s use of terrorism to promote
changes in the Middle East differs from previous organizations, such
as the Taliban or al Qaeda. These groups were fighting to promote their
view of Islam in different parts of the world; al Baghdadi and ISIS are
trying to establish the Caliphate in the Muslim world and, where God’s
judgment will come to pass. ISIS is also different from previous terrorist organizations due to its embrace of geography, pragmatism, and a
sense of nation-building. I highly recommend this short but timely book
addressing an organization that has had much written about it yet about
which much remains a mystery. Students of the US Army War College
would benefit from reading Napoleani’s work. ISIS and al Baghdadi have
learned that conquering territory is easy; the difficult part is managing
and providing what people need and want from their leaders.

Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on
Terrorism
Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann, editors
Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, PhD, Senior Lecturer in International Relations,
University of St Andrews

I

n Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists, Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann
reach out far beyond legal debates and into the field of counter-terrorism policies. The message of the book is the United States needs to move
away from a perspective that views the law as a cumbersome liability in
its fight against global terrorism and it ought to base its approach to this
task mainly on non-coercive means.
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On the whole, this book is worth reading. At first glance, parts of
the book seem to be stating obvious lessons from the “war on terror,”
such as the idea that adopting a war paradigm as a response to terrorist attacks can lead to inadequate and counterproductive policies. This
point has been made over and over again after 9/11. However, French
Prime Minister Manuel Valls’ announcement that “France is at war with
terrorism” after the 7/8 January 2015 attacks in Paris demonstrates it is a
point well worth repeating. Lessons from the “war on terror” are easily
forgotten in the panic ensuing a terrorist attack. The book provides a
store house of memory, patiently discussing arguments leading down
the wrong road and policy options which are likely to backfire.
However, the chapter on targeted killing is one of the weakest.
There is little in Blum and Heymann’s recommendations with which
US officials would disagree; targeted killing should be a measure of last
resort, targeted persons must pose a real threat, targeted killing has to be
lead by sound intelligence, and caution must be taken to avoid collateral
damage. In this case, the devil is in the definitional detail, but Blum and
Heymann do not dig deep enough to tease this out.
The book’s discussion of detention unfortunately focuses solely
“outside the combat zone” and implies detentions in Afghanistan
and Iraq were less problematic because detainees were apprehended
on the “battlefield” and therefore ought to be treated as prisoners of
war. However, a number of individuals who ended up in Guantanamo
were captured in Afghanistan and Iraq, though not necessarily on the
“battlefield,” and it was by no means clear whether or not they were
combatants.
The chapter on interrogation is the best in the book as it really pushes
the debate towards uncomfortable questions such as US cooperation with
foreign intelligence agencies possibly using torture. It also goes a long
way to deconstructing the “ticking bomb scenario” and shows it is merely
hypothetical scenario that should not guide our thinking on interrogation.
The third part of the book moves into the field of non-coercive
policies. It makes the case for abandoning the outright refusal to negotiate in favor of a case-by-case assessment, a point recent research has
supported. The second, more original suggestion the authors make is
akin to a global “hearts and minds” initiative towards the Muslim world
on the part of Western governments. This rests on the assumption that
the chief enabling factor of terrorist attacks is the popular support terrorists enjoy as far as their views of the Western world are concerned,
even if this support does not extend to the tactics they choose. This is
an interesting idea, even if it is not fully convincing. It does not address
the problem of homegrown terrorism specifically. Neither does it apply
to all sorts of “terrorisms,” as the authors seem to imply: historically, the
extreme left terrorist networks of the 1970s and 1980s relied much less
on popular support than current Jihadist terror networks do.
Yet these weaknesses should not distract from the fact that this is a
good book. It ought to be a must-read for policy-makers in the field of
counterterrorism. Terrorism scholars will find much in the book they
already know, but will be rewarded with carefully presented arguments
and discussions and will be able to use the book’s weaknesses as solid
indicators of issues needing further debate.
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Canadian Army
A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000
By Peter Kasurak
Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, PhD, Canadian Army Land
Warfare Centre and Editor in Chief, Canadian Army Journal

T

he history of Canada’s civil-military relationship after the end of the
Second World War is a complex story, parts of which remain largely
untold. Having started the war as a significant yet still subordinate ally to
the British Empire, Canada emerged from the war with a new voice of
independence shaped in part by its wartime relationship with the United
States. Still, for much of the Cold War era, Canada’s military forces found
themselves split between its British traditions and an emerging American
way of warfare resulting from latter’s dominant role in the cooperative
defence of North America, the Korean War, and NATO’s defence of
Western Europe.
In his most recent work, A National Force: The Evolution of Canada’s
Army, 1950-2000, independent scholar Peter Kasurak offers a broad and
sweeping narrative of the Canadian Army’s history from the Korean
War to the beginning of the War on Terror. While general histories of
the Canadian Army are nothing new, Kasurak’s study is very different
from previous offerings in its analysis of the chosen subject. Departing
from what he describes as “the standard narrative of the army’s history,”
Kasurak sets out to reframe a story often viewed through the lens of
Samuel Huntington’s Soldier and the State with the perspective of Peter
Feaver’s Armed Servants. The exercise is novel and intriguing, if not at
times outright controversial, with the results often at odds with the
established scholarship on the subject.
The history of the postwar Canadian Army is typically divided
into two eras. The period from 1945 to the unification of the Canadian
military in 1968 has at times been referred to as the “command era,”
followed afterwards by what many critics have referred to as a “management era.” The former is often perceived as a golden age of the Canadian
Army – British roots, influential, worldly, combat experienced, and professional. The latter - during which the army was integrated with the
other two armed services into a single unified service, ushered in what
one military historian later described as a “generation of professional
decline.” In the post-unification era, Canadian Army values had been
replaced with civilian business management concepts. British traditions
and ethos were discarded. It is this established narrative that Kasurak
takes aim at, and using Feaver’s agency theory sets out to demonstrate it
was in fact not the civilian leadership but rather the army that was “the
author of its own decline,” beginning not after unification but instead
right after the Second World War.
Any attempt to recast a military organization’s historical characteristics and attributes so significantly in a single study is bound to
run into difficulty, and Kasurak’s book is no exception. The history of
Canada’s postwar army has yet to receive detailed academic attention
and there remain some gaping holes in the basic narrative, never mind
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the analysis or revision of the existing historiography. For example, the
defence department’s historical directorate has published almost no official history of the Cold War era Canadian Army above the regimental
level. Moreover, army biography, especially of the senior Cold War era
leadership, is almost non-existent. There is no official history of the
postwar army headquarters or the Mobile Command organization that
replaced it after unification of the Canadian Forces. Many of the army’s
NATO operations and UN peacekeeping missions have yet to receive
proper official or academic histories.
Kasurak’s book had an opportunity to fill some of these critical
gaps in the historiography of the subject, so it was disappointing that
the author did not do so. Though it is framed as a critical study of the
army’s institutional evolution, unfortunately National Force is just another
history of civil-military relations that in this instance sides with the
civilians over the soldiers. There is in fact very little explanation in the
book of how the army actually functioned as an institution during the
Cold War, how headquarters functioned, how the army was commanded
or structured, or how the army’s combat development processes conceived, designed, built, and managed its various field forces. Similarly,
the defence operational research and development establishments that
influenced so many army procurement decisions during the Cold War
receives barely a nod in this study. Instead, readers are given limited
context of what shaped army decision-making leaving one to wonder
how the author was able to determine exactly that senior Canadian army
officers were engaged in a deliberate, decades-long campaign of “shirking” their duty to serve the state’s civilian leadership. Though Kasurak
admits “it should not be imagined that civilians are above criticism,”
too often he gives them a free pass, and this book is clearly aimed at
reducing the complex institutional processes of shaping armies through
war and peace into a singular struggle between the noble politician and
the nefarious general officer.
While the notion of challenging the army’s established narrative is
both original and welcome, missing scholarship has forced Kasurak to
gloss over critical elements of the army’s history and draw conclusions
without any proper foundational context. The result, unfortunately, is a
fractured and biased history that at times appears contrived rather than
deduced. In the absence of other scholarship on the period, this book
is recommended as an acceptable addition due to what new material it
does bring to the narrative. However, readers are cautioned to examine
its evidence and conclusions with a very critical eye.

Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day
By Marc Milner
Reviewed by Colonel Gert-Jan Kooij (Royal Netherlands Army)

University Press of Kansas,
Lawrence, Kansas; 2014.
400 pages
$34.95

E

ver since the fighting for the beaches of Normandy and the struggle
for the first objectives of Operation Overlord came to an end, the
role of the Canadian Army has been underestimated and undervalued.
In seven decades of historical publications, it has been accused of being
an ineffective force that benefited from good fortune. Although the
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Canadians fought hard, they were referred to as “hockey players led by
donkeys.” Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day proves these
allegations to be false. The story of the Canadians during Operation
Overlord, is one of well-trained and well-organized units fulfilling their
mission to stop the panzers.
Marc Milner is a well-respected professor and director of the
Brigadier Milton F. Gregg, VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society
at the University of New Brunswick. Additionally, he is an expert on
World War II with many books and publications on military history. In
2011, the Society of Military History awarded Milner the Moncado Prize
for his article in The Journal of Military History, based on his research for
Stopping the Panzers. He spent many years researching Operation Overlord.
In contrast to other historians he focused on the Canadian forces and
the German units opposing them. He and his team conducted research
in many archives such as those of the Canadian regiments, the Royal
Canadian History Institute in Toronto, the Howard Gottlieb Archives
in Boston, the Liddel-Hart Centre in London, the US Army Heritage
Center in Carlisle, and many other Canadian, British, American and
German archives. Milner also visited Normandy to understand better
the terrain and the environment in which the Canadians had to fight.
Stopping the Panzers is not a repetition of earlier books or journals
about Operation Overlord. It is a rich collection of new facts of the
Canadian role and the German opposition to the 7th and 9th Canadian
Brigades. Thorough research by the author and other scholars lead to
new facts. Operation Overlord was mainly about speed and operational
tempo and – in contrast to the other larger allied partners – this is not
what the Canadians displayed. The mission of the Canadians was never
to conduct a fast offensive operation. The mission for the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division was not to advance with speed and seize Caen, instead
the mission was to stop the impending German counterattack. The
Germans anticipated an allied landing on the beaches of Normandy.
One of their options was to thrust this landing back into the North Sea
with an armored attack on the allied bridgehead west of Caen, which is
precisely what they tried to do. Allied planners expected the Germans to
counterattack, which could have hampered the entire allied operation.
If the Germans had driven a wedge between the British and US armies,
the landing would have failed. The mission of the 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division was not to seize Caen, but to control key terrain along the road
from Bayeux to Caen, consolidate, and stop the counterattack. They
paid a high price with the highest numbers of casualties of all allied units
during this operation.
Stopping the Panzers is a paradigm shift in Canadian history on
Operation Overlord. It is a well-written book that is, despite the vast
amount of new facts, easy to read. Because it is based on rigorous
research from allied and German archives and because the author’s
familiarity with the terrain Stopping the Panzers is not just another book
about Operation Overlord, but a truly unique view on the Canadian
mission and role in the operation. Because it is so groundbreaking and
well-written it is a “must-have” for every individual interested the Second
World War. This is a job well done by Milner, his team, and above all,
the men of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division who paid a very high price
for doing what they had to do.
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Civil War, WWI, WWII, & the Vietnam War
Embattled Rebel: Jefferson Davis as Commander in Chief
By James M. McPherson
Reviewed by Matthew Pinsker, D.Phil, Associate Professor of History and
Pohanka Chair in American Civil War History at Dickinson College
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obody was better trained as a mid-nineteenth-century commander in chief than Jefferson Davis. There were more important
American military leaders and more successful Washington hands prior
to the Civil War, but Davis was almost unique in the way he navigated
both worlds. A graduate of West Point, combat veteran and war hero
(from his role as a regimental officer in the Mexican War), Davis was
also a long-serving US senator from Mississippi, who had chaired the
Committee on Military Affairs and held the post of Secretary of War
during the Pierce Administration. If anybody was prepared for the challenges of an American civil war, it was Davis. Yet both contemporaries
and historians have always appeared underwhelmed by the man whom
James McPherson now sympathetically labels, “The Embattled Rebel.”
Part of the problem was too much expertise. Davis knew better
than his generals how to fight the war, and with a few exceptions (such
as in his relationship with Robert E. Lee), he meddled and micromanaged incessantly. McPherson goes so far as to claim, “No other chief
executive in American history exercised such hands-on influence in the
shaping of military strategy.” (11) That’s a bold statement in light of
Abraham Lincoln’s equally assertive leadership style, but the noted Civil
War historian demonstrates time and again how obsessive Davis was
about exercising his duties as commander in chief. The signs were apparent from the beginning, when on Sunday morning, July 21, 1861, the
Confederate president “could stand it no longer” and “commandeered a
special train” to take him out to the first great battlefield of the war near
Manassas Junction. (41) There, Davis even acted briefly as a field commander, “rallying” straggling troops by proclaiming, on horseback, “I
am Jefferson Davis…Follow me back to the field.” (41) Lincoln, too, saw
a little bit of combat in 1864 at Fort Stevens near Washington, but the
former Illinois militia captain never ventured anything quite as bold as
this. Nor was Lincoln as aggressive as Davis in demanding face-to-face
conferences with his generals in the field, though both civilian leaders
were surprisingly eager throughout the conflict to travel out to the frontlines to see for themselves what was happening.
Of course, Lincoln usually gets praised for being attentive to such
details while Davis often gets vilified for nitpicking. McPherson warns
against allowing these sorts of comparisons to cloud a more objective
evaluation of the losing side of this equation. Instead, the author tries to
understand Davis on his own terms and that’s exactly what makes this
particular Rebel leader seem so embattled. Even the most devoted Civil
War buff will be surprised by how early and often Davis found himself
criticized and undermined by his own contemporaries. At his First
Inaugural address as an elected president, delivered on February 22,
1862, Davis felt compelled to acknowledge, “we have recently met with
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serious disasters,” (66) even though the war was not yet a year old. And
soon after those sobering remarks, Davis’s favorite field commander,
Albert Sidney Johnston, was dead (mortally wounded at Shiloh) and the
Confederate’s most popular general at the time, Pierre G.T. Beauregard,
essentially went absent without leave, forcing Davis to relieve him. The
western theatre was proving disastrous for the Confederacy, an especially
painful reality for the Mississippian in charge. And by late spring 1862,
the Union forces, which had successfully sailed out from the defenses
of Washington to the Virginia peninsula, were only miles away from
capturing Richmond.
Fortunately for Davis and the Confederacy, out of this grim
period General Lee emerged as kind of military savior, accepting field
command in early June 1862 and then earning an extraordinary run
of victories over the next year with the Army of Northern Virginia,
until their terrible defeat at Gettysburg in July 1863. But even so, the
underlying trouble for Davis during that selective series of triumphs
was how much Lee’s success as a military strategist often collided what
McPherson terms here the “policy” interests of the Confederacy. (9)
Southern military offensives in the fall of 1862, for example, actually
alienated Border States such as Maryland and Kentucky, and did little
to affect diplomatic affairs. Lee’s audacious tactics also came at a high
human cost — one the lesser-populated Confederacy could ill-afford.
Even if Davis could forget some of these problems — and
McPherson makes clear he never did — whatever hopefulness the
Confederate president may have derived from Lee’s short-term gains
was soon lost in a cascade of recriminations over setbacks in the west
and elsewhere. Davis spent weeks traveling across the South trying to
quell problems among his feuding generals, especially regarding his
deeply unpopular western departmental commander, Braxton Bragg.
Nothing worked. There were also desperate problems with commissary
and supply, made worse by poor administrative decisions. The tetchy
cabinet was a revolving door — four different secretaries of state, five
secretaries of war, and one miserably unhappy vice-president. Moreover,
Davis faced deepening resistance from a balky Confederate Congress,
anxious state officials, and a growing southern peace faction. Then, on
April 30, 1864, the beleaguered president’s five-year-old son died tragically, after falling from a balcony at the Confederate White House.
Yet despite all of it, Davis endured. He was in poor health
throughout the conflict and repeatedly beset by critics, but what emerges
from McPherson’s compact study is the portrait of a leader undaunted.
Davis may have been irritable, but he was never defeatist. While he has
always been a difficult man to admire, McPherson, who openly acknowledges his sympathies for the Union, nevertheless has created provocative
grounds for greater empathy and deeper analysis than most readers have
ever tried to devote to the forlorn figure of Jefferson Davis.
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Doughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed
Their Military Experience
By Edward A. Gutiérrez
Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy
Plans & Operations, US Army War College
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Press of Kansas, 2014
320 pages
$34.95

D

oughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed Their Military
Experience, by Edward A. Gutiérrez, was written with the goal of
capturing how American soldiers thought about their experience in the
First World War. In particular, Gutiérrez sought to reveal the motivation of the men “to answer their country’s call.” The book opens with a
discussion of how views and memories change over time. The challenge
for Gutiérrez was to find reliable sources capturing the thoughts and
feelings of American soldiers in the First World War during, or close to,
the end of their military service. The obvious starting point for such data
were biographies and personal letters. Yet, Gutiérrez also sought sources
posing similar questions to “establish broader patterns of understanding and ascertain why men fought.” (3) The solution for the author was
found in post-war questionnaires distributed by the states of Virginia,
Connecticut, Utah and Minnesota. Gutiérrez spent fourteen years studying these surveys and found that data collected shortly after the soldiers
returned from military service portrayed their feelings and motivations
more accurately. By using this information, Doughboys on the Great War
endeavored to explain “why individuals volunteer to go to war, and, if
reality fails to match expectations …to ascertain the cause of these erroneous presumptions.” (12)
Using data collected largely from these questionnaires, Gutiérrez
traced the impressions and motivations of the “Doughboys” from their
entry into the Army, to basic training, the journey to France, combat,
and home again. Just as was the case in Europe 1914, patriotic enthusiasm proved to be one of the chief motivations in joining the military in
1917 and 1918. Yet, there was something grander than this. Gutiérrez
uncovered, in his extensive research, a sense of duty was indeed a greater
motivation than enthusiasm. To highlight this view, a Virginian is
quoted as saying “I believe now that it is the duty of every man to serve
his country in time of need.” (23)
Yet, the sense of duty could not make up for the lack of preparedness in the United States. Upon arriving at basic training, the men of
the fledgling American armed forces found a lack of equipment, tanks,
planes, clothes and even rifles. The Wilson Administration naively
believed preparation for war would provoke war. When war finally
came in April 1917, the United States lacked what it needed to train
and equip a modern army. Instead, soldiers often trained with wooden
rifles, under the instruction of an officer, who equally lacked the skills
needed to train a force for war. Indeed, many men would needlessly die
in combat due to inadequate training and preparation. As one soldier
wryly commented, “It is however, a matter of grave discussion, why,
when at Camp Gordon, we were taught to sing, while after the armistice
we were taught to fight” (Frank Holden, War Memories. Athens, GA:
Athens Book Company, 1922 [77]).
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Gutiérrez discovered insufficient physical preparation was compounded by a lack of psychological understanding. Once the soldiers
experienced the reality of modern war, they found neither a sense of
duty nor enthusiasm could help them overcome fear and devastation.
Instead, the moral character they had developed in life before entering
the army proved vital. Quoting one veteran in this regard, “Men get out
of war what they brought to it.” Gutiérrez rightly added, “The prewar
life experience and personality of a soldier dictate how that soldier will
react in battle. Individual predispositions share a soldier’s experience.”
(44) This proved especially true in the US military of the First World
War, which lacked the skills to train an army for modern warfare.
Although outside of the scope of the book, a more extensive
description of the campaigns and engagements in which the Doughboys
fought would have provided better context for the reader. This would
have enhanced its value by putting into perspective the views of the
soldiers who experienced battle. Yet, despite this, Gutiérrez provides a
well-researched and thoughtful book.
Doughboys on the Great War is a gripping and engaging view into the
feelings and perspectives of the average soldier before, during, and
immediately after World War I. It does a terrific job painting a picture of
the soldier’s experience, to include an engaging description of the motivations driving Italian-Americans and African-Americans in proving
their worth in battle to reflect their value as citizens. Overall, Gutiérrez’s
book is a valuable contribution to the historiography on the First World
War, and a welcome addition to the Centennial commemoration of the
tragic epoch.

A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the
Collapse of the Habsburg Empire
By Geoffrey Wawro
Reviewed by James D. Scudieri, PhD, (Col., USA [Ret]), Independent
Consultant & Research Analyst, US Army Heritage and Education Center,
Historical Services Division

T

he present work is a long-overdue look at a neglected topic on the
First World War. Author Geoffrey Wawro is a well established author
with earlier monographs on the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian
Wars of 1866 and 1870 respectively. His current work blazes a new trail.
A Mad Catastrophe examines the pre-war Austro-Hungarian Empire,
policy makers’ monumental decisions, and the disastrous operations in
1914. The acknowledgments section is a fascinating read unto itself on
his ancestors and their links to the current story. He intends to demolish
the myth of the quaint Austro-Hungarian Empire under grandfatherly
Emperor Franz Joseph. His introduction sets the stage in no uncertain
terms.
Chapters 1 through 5 describe the peacetime Dual Monarchy,
including war plans and the pre-military response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. He sees an
unworkable state, the more so due to Magyar duplicity; Austrian inadequacy; and unsolvable, ethnic tensions, which demanded national,
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self-determination. Franz Joseph, the venerable Emperor from 1848, is
out of his depth in the unraveling domestic situation and the more-challenged diplomacy of the early twentieth century during its latest crisis.
Domestically, his shortcomings were glaring in a structure that empowered him over a bureaucracy of ostensibly representative institutions.
Wawro explains why the Hapsburg state did not posture itself for
success. The long-expected showdown with Serbia, showcased by the
assassinations, provided more challenges than opportunities. Diplomacy
notwithstanding, nearly six weeks passed before troops invaded Serbia.
Swift action by Austria would have capitalized upon international sympathy. More critically, Chief of General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf
should have understood Austria’s limitations in fighting both Serbia and
Russia simultaneously. A Serbian campaign had to be immediate or not
at all.
The text paints a similarly dismal picture of Austro-Hungarian conflict of military operations. Chapters 6 through 13 cover 1914. Austrian
General Oskar Potiorek commanded no less than three disastrous
invasions of Serbia in four months, between August and December.
Conrad sabotaged proper weighting of effort and deployment in either
theater. The fighting in Galicia ebbed and flowed, but Wawro’s thrust is
poor Austro-Hungarian performance against a better-prepared Russian
Army, despite its own challenges. Chapter 14 outlines the devastating
cost to the Empire of just five months of war with staggering casualties.
He is not the first historian to state Austria-Hungary retained a sort of
“militia army” due to losses in experienced officers and noncommissioned officers, besides untrained conscripts. The Epilogue reviews the
rest of the war, marked by faster decline, and the unsuccessful, post-war
successor states to Austria-Hungary.
In essence, the political, social, and economic situation of the
Habsburg state meant significantly underfunded budgets for manning
and equipping with tremendous ramifications for preparedness. Scripted
exercise scenarios substituted for free-thinking maneuvers. Numerous
aspects of national power lacked adequate capability and capacity.
Austro-Hungarian land forces did not have the strategic basis, operational finesse, and tactical articulation for the characteristics of warfare
and the proposed doctrinal solutions to the dilemma of defensive firepower. The army had not seen action in nearly half a century; whereas
the Serbians were battle-hardened after two Balkan wars. The Russians
had learned important lessons from the war with Japan in 1905. Some
Austro-Hungarian leaders understood modern warfare, but learning
was far too uneven across the force.
The author made skillful use of well-documented, primary sources.
He has masterfully woven official documents, senior leaders’ evaluations, subordinates’ comments, and foreign observations into smoothly
flowing prose. He astutely blends the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. Moreover, the book’s maps integrate the analysis between armies
and corps on the ground, while the text showcases the exceptional
degree to which infantry divisions with thousand-man battalions were
the “coin of the realm” of land power. Note these divisions were large
formations, the more so as Austria-Hungary and Russia fielded divisions
of eighteen and sixteen battalions respectively, compared to the more
common twelve.
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The book shows the deadly combination of rabid ethnic nationalism
unleashed in total, industrialized warfare. Atrocity begets atrocity on
both sides. Austro-Hungarian treatment of Serbs in particular in 1914
aroused some senior officers’ outrage at such excesses.
The particular use of primary sources leads to the book’s greatest challenge, which is balance. Wawro leaves no doubt repeatedly and
explicitly that Austrian leaders, the Emperor and Conrad in particular,
were blundering incompetents. The Dual Monarchy was ineradicably
flawed, hopelessly unprepared, executed its plans ineptly. The reader
is left wondering how such an entity could have waged four years of
protracted war unprecedented in totality. It was not alone in woefully
under-forecasted requirements for a prolonged war with a muchexpanded force structure. Insufficient tactical articulation to counter the
power of the defense, and shortcomings in battlefield intelligence to set
the stage for a successful attack too frequently turned potential flanking
attacks and synchronized assaults into catastrophic failures.
The book often reads more as an indictment, rather than an assessment. The text tends to present the demise of the Hapsburgs as a
predestined, linear decline from peacetime unpreparedness to wartime
bungling. Wawro faced unique challenges with these primary sources.
Still, more helpful would have been an integrated, comprehensive analysis of politics, economics, manpower, and equipment production, etc.
This issue of balance perhaps symbolizes the conflicted twenty-firstcentury mind in comprehending the inconceivable wastage of the Great
War on most unforgiving battlefields with punishing learning curves
for both attacker and defender. Arguably, a revolution in military affairs
(RMA) took place between 1914 and 1918. There were shortcomings
aplenty in 1914. Yet, what army of the major powers realistically could
develop a defensive doctrine that could win a war quickly? The politicians would not end the war, the diplomats could not, and the generals
groped for war-winning solutions.
Austria-Hungary’s most senior leaders too often decided poorly.
Arguably, they made more mistakes than their foes; but these errors
were unaffordable given their army’s inherent weaknesses, compounded under wartime conditions. Also, a German “rescue” seems an
inadequate explanation of individual and collective political, social, and
military resiliency to 1918.
Wawro’s book is nonetheless an important work, a case study of
senior leaders facing increasingly acute challenges without clear solutions.
Indeed, he convincingly explains how Austria-Hungary was conceivably
the major power least prepared to wage war in 1914, even compared
to Russia and Turkey. There are numerous insights for the twenty-first
century. Peacetime plans and wartime execution must account for shifting diplomatic, political, social, and economic factors; plus they must
balance national perspectives and interests with alliance/coalition goals.
Indeed, the wider and more complete research on the Great War to date
highlights the depth and breadth of mistrust among the powers. Their
interests evolved before and during the war, often in unforeseen ways.
Wawro shows how diverging Austrian and German strategic and operational aims can make ostensible allies into competitors or adversaries.
Finally, perhaps Wawro’s greatest illumination is how Austrian leaders
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failed to comprehend the Clausewitizian notion of war as serious means
to serious end, replete with chance.

The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941
By Roger Moorhouse
Reviewed by Joseph A Maiolo, Professor of International History, King’s
College London

T
Basic Books: New York,
NY 2014
372 pages
$29.99

he Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939 is one of the most notorious
diplomatic arrangements of all time. With this deal on economic
cooperation and spheres of influence between the Third Reich and the
Soviet Union, Hitler and Stalin crushed Poland, divided up central and
Eastern Europe between them and heralded the coming of the Second
World War. During the Cold War, historians could only consult the
German records of the negotiations leading to the non-aggression pact
and the brief period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration, but since the collapse
of the Soviet Union our knowledge of the Soviet side of the episode has
benefited enormously from the opening up of Russian archives.
In The Devils’ Alliance, Roger Moorhouse draws on the latest research
and sources to offer readers a vivid retelling of the making and breaking of the deal. He carefully reconstructs the game of political hardball
played play by the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
and his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov. The absorbing story
of the diplomatic bargaining over frontiers and trade is set against
the wider context of the implementation of the pact. The twenty-two
months of Nazi-Soviet collaboration enabled the two regimes to experiment in the brutal imposition of their ideological visions on the peoples
of Eastern Europe. Behind the German armies, advancing into Poland
came special police units to murder Jews and others deemed enemies of
the Third Reich; the advance of the Red Army permitted Moscow step
by step to Sovietize its share of eastern Poland and the Baltic states and
to murder or exile its political foes. With great skill, Moorhouse conveys
the human tragedy of these events with telling details from individual
experiences. Through these individual tragedies multiplied thousands of
times over, Moorhouse reminds us why the collective memories of the
period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration overshadow the politics of Eastern
Europe to this day.
Moorhouse underscores the basis of the deal was strategic, not ideological. Although the two regimes are often lumped together under the
“totalitarian” rubric, there was no red-brown political affinity drawing
them together. Ribbentrop may have dreamed about a grand alliance
between the Axis states and the Soviet Union to confront AngloAmerican powers, but he was alone in this respect. Hitler needed the
pact to isolate Poland. Stalin opted for it because he could archive Soviet
territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe and remain out of the impending
European war, at least temporarily. In this respect, it is worth recalling
the Nazi-Soviet Pact failed to achieve Hitler’s primary purpose: he had
hoped the stunning announcement of the pact would persuade London
and Paris to abandon Poland to its fate and to seek a peaceful way out of
the European crisis of 1939.
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As we know, Britain and France did not seek peace because they
were determined to defend their status as great powers, and the balance
of economic-military power was ultimately in their favor. Germany
avoided a slow defeat through attrition and economic strangulation
by the swift victory over France in May-June 1940. No one was more
surprised than Stalin, who had predicted his deal with Hitler gave the
Soviet Union a few years of peace to arm and prepare for the expected
war against Germany and its allies. Although Moorhouse correctly dates
the formal German decision to attack the Soviet Union to December
1940, Hitler began to air the idea with his top military advisors just after
the French sued for peace. He was never at ease with a grand political
bargain that allowed Moscow to acquire German machine tools and
blueprints of advance weapons in exchange for industrial raw materials.
Mistakenly convinced they could defeat the Red Army in a few weeks,
the German high command enthusiastically prepared for Operation
Barbarossa. In 1941, Soviet intelligence reported these preparations with
growing alarm, but Stalin dismissed them as provocations to lure him
into a war he did not want. He saw the German arms buildup in Eastern
Europe as part of the hard bargaining process over territory and trade
the Nazi-Soviet pact had initiated. In a report of 5 June 1941, the Joint
Intelligence Committee in London came to the same conclusion. Stalin
simply did not expect Hitler would attack until the war against Britain
and its informal ally the United States had ended. As Moorhouse shows
in his book, Stalin’s failure to anticipate the German attack cost the Red
Army and the people of the Soviet Union dearly.

Four Decades On: Vietnam, the United States, and the
Legacies of the Second Indochina War
Scott Laderman, Edwin A. Martini, eds.
Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, PhD, Georgia Southern University

T

he American War in Vietnam continues to engage creative scholars
from across diverse academic disciplines to rethink both the legacies of the war and the war itself. The editors of Four Decades On have
assembled an impressive collection of scholarship in this vein, drawing
from the transnational study of identity, memory, film, culture, tourism,
and economy. The contributors explore boundaries, official histories and
counter-narratives, and remembrance and reconciliation to assess the
enduring legacies of a ten-year war, now literally Four Decades On, and
they go beyond traditional, though still useful, American or Vietnamesecentric approaches. The resulting collection compels reflection on how
assumptions and myths influence memory, and emphasizes the illuminating conclusions of new, cross-disciplinary approaches applied to
understand better the deep and lingering legacy of this war. In this, the
editors succeed.
Christina Schwenkel, for example, an anthropologist at the
University of California, Riverside, argues transnationalism influences
the evolving narrative of the war exhibited at museums, memorials, and
other war-related sites in Vietnam. As Vietnam’s economy becomes
more global and war tourism gains popularity among American visitors, narratives at these sites (which Schwenkel calls “memory-scapes”)
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have shifted from the older hurray-for-we-defeated-the-Americans to a
softer, more American friendly tone, often focusing on mutual victimhood of combatants and non-combatants, regardless of nationality. For
Schwenkel, reconciliation, ironically, may be the most important if not
unintended consequence of Vietnam’s desire to open markets with the
United States and court American tourists.
Analyzing cultural legacies looms large in this collection. Historian
Walter Hixson, of the University of Akron, examines how Americans
have emphasized healing and overcoming the Vietnam Syndrome
through a variety of means, but most interestingly through film, which
tends to focus on the American soldier as victim and the Vietnamese
as nearly invisible. These cultural influences allow revisionist history to
take root, which can deflect attention from real questions of American
intent in Vietnam and American militarism in general.
Fitting well into this rubric of memory, narrative, and reconciliation
are the divisive issues of “Agent Orange” and accounting for POWs/
MIAs. The legacies of both have been strewn with myth, politics, and
manipulation. Diane Niblack Fox, an anthropologist who also teaches
Vietnamese Studies at the College of the Holy Cross, offers one the
better article-length studies of this controversial issue. Fox looks at
the impact of the use of chemical defoliants from multiple perspectives – science, medicine, public policy and law, the work of non-profits,
history, and most interestingly the actual experience of those directly
affected. She ably dissects the various meanings and contexts of “Agent
Orange” among diverse constituencies that transcend class, borders,
and even time. Fox argues that closing the gap between state policy
and international relations with individual experiences and needs is key
to approaching reconciliation for Americans and Vietnamese over the
“Agent Orange” controversy. H. Bruce Franklin, professor of English
and American Studies at Rutgers University, likewise tackles the POW/
MIA myth, providing again one of the better article-length examinations of the evolution of this extremely sensitive issue. From the political
manipulations of the Nixon administration to Chuck Norris’ numerous
Missing in Action films, Franklin pulls no punches in explaining how
the POW/MIA myth maintained momentum from its apparent usefulness in all but silencing the anti-war movement in the early 1970s to
perpetuating the myth through flying the black POW/MIA flags as a
way to focus on American victims of the war rather than on why the
United States engaged in such a disastrous war in the first place. Similar
to Hixon, for Franklin, the POW/MIA myth conveniently enables
Americans to ignore the difficult national questions of memory and
legacy from Vietnam.
This collection will find eager readership among specialists and
graduate students, but those with a more passing interest in what is the
most innovative scholarship on the Vietnam War will find some of the
essays difficult. Because some among the academic community insist
on using pretentious terminology and, further, assume all are familiar
with their particular discipline’s theoretical frameworks, they make their
otherwise valuable work inaccessible to a willing cross-disciplinary audience. This frustrating problem crops up across the collection and can
be distracting. Another minor and related issue is a hint of rejection
toward more traditional historical approaches. Scholars utilizing these
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new, important approaches should be mindful of the debt they owe to
the useful work that preceded theirs which provides a firm foundation
for historical understanding, without these newer methods they would
have no context and little upon which to build.
Do not let these concerns, however, discourage reading these valuable essays. Four Decades On challenges assumptions, dispels myths,
and offers insightful arguments on causation, memory, narrative, and
reconciliation among nations and, more interestingly, among peoples.
As we enter fiftieth anniversaries of key events of the American War in
Vietnam, we will be reminded how much that experience continues to
affect us, and how we are still unwilling to engage in an honest discussion on “Vietnam.” Laderman and Martini have compiled a provocative
collection of the best new scholarship on the “Second Indochina War.”
Specialists should read it and engage in the conversation.

